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ABSTRACT
Thirty years ago, the international community took a hard line
against international parental kidnapping. The Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction allows parental
child abduction only in rare circumstances, such as when returning
the child would create a “grave risk” of harm. Recently, mothers who
have abducted their children when fleeing domestic violence have
successfully pled this grave-risk exception, demonstrating the
Convention’s relevance to the realities of domestic violence. This Note
welcomes that development, but argues that the rights of left-behind
parents, who increasingly are fathers, must also be taken into
account. Left-behind fathers, whether guilty of domestic violence or
not, face significant challenges litigating their cases in the United
States, and an overbroad interpretation of the grave-risk exception
would only heighten these challenges. To remain fair, the Convention
can—and must—consider the rights and realities of left-behind
fathers.
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INTRODUCTION
The phrase “child abduction” conjures up haunting images of
strangers kidnapping children from their parents. Yet far more
prevalent are cases in which the children’s parents are themselves the
1
abductors. Parental child abduction, also called family abduction or
parental kidnapping, occurs when one parent takes a child across
state lines and retains the child without the consent of the other
2
parent. Often, parental abductors do not just cross state lines; many
take their children across international borders.
The problem of international parental kidnapping is particularly
acute for the United States. More children are abducted into or out of
3
the United States than any other party to the Hague Convention on
4
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Convention), the
international treaty that governs child abductions between
contracting states. In 2009, 1,194 children were abducted from the
United States, and 486 children were abducted into the United States
5
from abroad. It is thus unsurprising that cases of international
6
parental kidnapping frequently seize headlines.
When the Convention was drafted, the paradigmatic abductor
was thought to be a noncustodial father, and issues of domestic

1. In 1999, there were 56,500 reported cases of family child abduction in the United
States, whereas there were only 12,100 cases of nonfamily child abduction. Andrea J. Sedlak,
David Finkelhor, Heather Hammer & Dana J. Schultz, National Estimates of Missing Children:
An Overview, NISMART (Off. Juv. Just. & Delinq. Prevention, D.C.), Oct. 2002, at 6, available
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/196465.pdf.
2. See id. at 4 (defining “family abduction”).
3. NIGEL LOWE, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, A STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS MADE IN 2003 UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25
OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: PART II—
NATIONAL REPORTS 479 (2007 update) (2008), available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/wop/
abd_pd03ef2007.pdf.
4. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98.
5. These numbers represent only abductions between the United States and other
contracting states. OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON
COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION 68 (2010), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/2010ComplianceReport.
pdf.
6. For example, the case of Sean Goldman, who was abducted to Brazil by his mother five
years ago and only recently returned to his father in the United States, attracted considerable
media attention. See, e.g., Sharon Cotliar & Dom Phillips, ‘I Want My Son Back,’ PEOPLE, Mar.
23, 2009, at 137; Kirk Semple & Mery Galanternick, Boy and Father Back in U.S. After
Reuniting in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at A27.
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violence had not yet become salient in the public eye. Presently,
however, the majority of international parental child abductors are
custodial mothers, many of whom are fleeing from or claim to be
8
fleeing from violent relationships. When petitioned to return their
children pursuant to the Convention, these fleeing mothers frequently
seize upon Article 13(b) of the Convention, which allows a judge to
9
deny return when it would pose a “grave risk” of harm to the child.
This invocation of Article 13(b) has proven effective. Recent case law
has begun to reflect an interpretation of Article 13(b) that is sensitive
to domestic-violence victims and their children—even when the
10
violence was directed solely at the fleeing mother, not the child.
Similarly, scholars have urged an interpretation of Article 13(b) that
11
protects those fleeing from violent relationships. As a result, the
Convention, through the interpretation of Article 13(b)’s grave-risk
exception, has largely—though not entirely—adapted to the realities
12
of interparental violence.

7. See PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 8–9 (1999) (citing studies from the 1970s and 1980s
indicating that between 71 and 75 percent of abductors were male); Merle H. Weiner,
International Child Abduction and the Escape from Domestic Violence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
593, 611–14 (2000) (noting that the media and legislators did not become aware of the role of
domestic violence in motivating abductions until the early 1990s).
8. Nigel V. Lowe & Katarina Horosova, The Operation of the 1980 Hague Abduction
Convention—A Global View, 41 FAM. L.Q. 59, 67–68 (2007) (noting that 68 percent of all
abductors are mothers).
9. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
4, art. 13(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
10. See, e.g., Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming a finding of
grave risk of harm when the violence was directed solely at the abducting mother, not the child);
Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570–71 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding grave risk of
harm when the violence was directed solely at the abducting mother and only threats were made
against the child); Miltiadous v. Tetervak, 686 F. Supp. 2d 544, 553–54 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding
grave risk of harm based on spousal abuse).
11. See, e.g., Carol S. Bruch, The Unmet Needs of Domestic Violence Victims and Their
Children in Hague Child Abduction Convention Cases, 38 FAM. L.Q. 529, 532–35 (2004)
(arguing that a narrow interpretation of the grave-risk exception does little to protect domesticviolence victims or their children); John Caldwell, Child Abduction Cases: Evaluating Risks to
the Child and the Convention, 23 N.Z. U. L. REV. 161, 164 (2008) (noting the trend among “a
number of legal academics” who advocate for a broader interpretation of Article 13(b));
Weiner, supra note 7, at 651–62 (arguing that a broader interpretation of the grave-risk
exception would better protect domestic-violence victims).
12. This Note uses the phrase “interparental violence” interchangeably with “domestic
violence” to refer to violence directed against the adult parent, not the child. Although cases in
which physical violence is directed toward the child could also be termed “domestic violence,”
those cases more clearly fall within the ambit of Article 13(b) and are beyond the scope of this
Note.
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Yet fleeing parents and their children are not the only
constituency whose rights merit protection in abduction cases.
Parents whose children are abducted also enjoy rights under the
Convention. Whether or not these left-behind parents, who
13
increasingly are fathers, are guilty of domestic violence, they are
entitled at least to a fair hearing to seek the return of their children—
especially given that the outcome of a Convention hearing will
determine the key question of where custody is litigated. Left-behind
fathers seeking to litigate their cases in the United States currently
face considerable logistical challenges, including access to counsel.
These challenges will be magnified if Article 13(b) is interpreted too
broadly. If the grave-risk exception is not carefully interpreted,
Convention disputes will acquire some of the features of custody
disputes, such as inquiry into the child’s best interests, that allow
gender stereotypes to color outcomes. Blurring the standard
appropriate for custody cases—best interests of the child—with the
one reserved for Convention cases—grave risk of harm—will only
undermine the rights of left-behind fathers.
Part I of this Note introduces the purposes of the Convention,
the requirements for a prima facie case of abduction, and possible
defenses. Part II describes how domestic violence, even if directed
solely at the fleeing parent, may be grounds for a refusal to return the
child under Article 13(b) of the Convention because of the wellknown effects of exposure to domestic violence on children. It also
suggests that fleeing mothers should be subject to a slightly lighter
evidentiary burden when making claims under Article 13(b). Part III,
however, balances the rights of left-behind fathers against the rights
of fleeing mothers and stresses that left-behind fathers face
formidable logistical challenges that will be exacerbated if Article
13(b) is interpreted too loosely. Gender bias evident in custody
disputes and in Supreme Court decisions threatens to afflict
Convention cases if Article 13(b) is not interpreted carefully.
Fortunately, the domestic abduction framework offers solutions to
ward off this danger and protect the rights of left-behind fathers.
Recent interpretations of Article 13(b) have rightly recognized
the gravity of interparental violence by adapting the Convention to
provide refuge for fleeing mothers and their children. Any
interpretation of Article 13(b), however, must take into account the

13. See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
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precarious and unique situation of left-behind fathers. The rights and
realities of left-behind fathers as well as those of domestic-violence
victims must be protected in international family-law disputes if the
Convention is to remain both relevant and fair.
I. STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF THE CONVENTION
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
14
Child Abduction, which has been incorporated into federal law, has
two key objectives: to deter child abduction and to provide for the
15
swift return of abducted children. To serve these aims, the
16
Convention creates a “qualified summary-return mechanism,”
whereby judges must order the return of abducted children unless any
of five exceptions apply. The most relevant exception here—and the
17
one that is most commonly pled worldwide —is the grave-risk
exception under Article 13(b). The Convention’s purpose and design
illustrate the need to interpret Article 13(b) judiciously in order to
protect the rights of both fleeing mothers and left-behind fathers.
A. Purpose of the Convention
Before the Convention entered into force, it was exceedingly
18
difficult to recover a child abducted internationally by a parent.

14. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2006).
Although the Convention was drafted in 1980, and ratified by the United States in 1986, it did
not become effective until 1988, when Congress incorporated it into federal law. JAMES D.
GARBOLINO, INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY CASES: HANDLING HAGUE CONVENTION
CASES IN U.S. COURTS 14 (3d ed. 2000).
15. Specifically, the Convention’s twin objectives are “[t]o secure the prompt return of
children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State” and “[t]o ensure that
rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected
in the other Contracting States.” Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, supra note 4, art.1, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98; see also ELISA PÉREZ-VERA, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, EXPLANATORY REPORT (1981), reprinted in 3 ACTES ET
DOCUMENTS DE LA QUATORZIÈME SESSION: ENLÈVEMENT D’ENFANTS ¶ 25, at 426, 432
(1982), available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/expl28.pdf (identifying the two objectives of
the Convention as the prevention of abduction and the swift return of children). The PérezVera Report is the highly influential official report that accompanied the Convention. See
Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg.
10,494, 10,503 (Mar. 26, 1986) (identifying the Pérez-Vera Report as the “official history and
commentary on the Convention and . . . a source of background on the meaning of the
provisions of the Convention”).
16. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29.
17. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 161.
18. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 3.
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Even if the child could be located in a foreign country, courts in that
country were reluctant to order the child’s return without lengthy
proceedings, which made it less likely that return would actually
19
benefit the child. In a world in which individual mobility and
20
international marriage were on the rise, it soon became apparent
that an international, cooperative response would be necessary to
combat the growing problem of parental child abduction.
The Convention provides that response by creating an
21
international legal framework common to all contracting states that
both deters parental abduction and ensures the swift return of
22
children who are wrongfully abducted. The Convention is rooted in
23
the fundamental idea that abduction harms children. Abducting
24
children uproots them from familiar surroundings, puts them at risk
25
of serious emotional and psychological problems, and strains or even
26
breaks their bonds with their left-behind parents. The effects of
abduction, unfortunately, outlive the abduction itself; even if
returned, many abducted children continue to have significant
27
emotional and physical problems. The left-behind parents of

19. Id.
20. Id. at 2.
21. At the time of publication of this Note, there are eighty-two contracting states to the
Convention. Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Status Table, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L L., http://hcch.e-vision.nl/index_
en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Dec. 18, 2010).
22. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(a)(3)–(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 11601(a)(3)–(4) (2006) (recognizing that international cooperation is necessary to deter
international child abduction and that the Convention provides a framework for swift return);
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
23. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(1) (“The
international abduction or wrongful retention of children is harmful to their well-being.”);
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 4, pmbl.,
1343 U.N.T.S. at 98 (“The States signatory to the present Convention . . . [d]esiring to protect
children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention . . .
[h]ave resolved to conclude a Convention . . . .”).
24. TREVOR BUCK, INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW 131 (2005).
25. The Human and Social Cost of International Parental Child Abduction, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/abduction/solutions/solutions_3872.html (last
visited Jan. 9, 2011).
26. Julia Alanen, When Human Rights Conflict: Mediating International Parental
Kidnapping Disputes Involving the Domestic Violence Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 49, 57 (2008). For this reason, the action of abduction itself can be considered a form of
domestic violence. Id. at 74.
27. Geoffrey L. Greif, A Parental Report on the Long-Term Consequences for Children of
Abduction by the Other Parent, 31 CHILD PSYCHIATRY & HUMAN DEV. 59, 67–70 (2000)
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abducted children similarly suffer emotional stress and turmoil,
29
which can continue long after the children are returned. As
Congress recognized when it incorporated the Convention into
domestic law, only international cooperation can effectively minimize
30
these harms.
31
The interests of children thus lie at the heart of the Convention.
Yet its novelty is that the Convention seeks to respond to the
32
interests of children collectively. Instead of allowing a detailed bestinterests-of-the-child analysis in every case, the Convention permits
only the narrow inquiry of whether the child’s removal was
33
wrongful. If the abduction was wrongful, and if the abducting parent
34
fails to prove an exception that justifies the abduction, the child will
be returned forthwith to her country of habitual residence so that the
35
merits of the underlying custody dispute can be litigated there.
36
Thus, Convention cases are not custody cases. Rather, the
Convention establishes a legal mechanism for determining where the

(describing various postrecovery symptoms of abducted children); id. at 67 (finding that 42
percent of abducted children in the sample continued to have “significant problems” over time).
28. MAUREEN DABBAGH, THE RECOVERY OF INTERNATIONALLY ABDUCTED CHILDREN
14 (1997) (describing the intense emotional strain under which left-behind parents labor);
MARILYN FREEMAN, REUNITE INT’L, INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: THE EFFECTS 29–
31 (2006), available at http://www.reunite.org/edit/files/Library - Reunite Publications/
Effects Of Abduction Report.pdf (describing the symptoms of left-behind parents, ranging from
physical sickness to shock to suicidal thoughts).
29. Greif, supra note 27, at 68 (finding that some left-behind parents’ feelings of rage,
depression, and anxiety continue for up to a decade after the abduction).
30. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(a)(3)–(4), 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(3)–
(4) (2006).
31. The preamble to the Convention states that “the interests of children are of paramount
importance in matters relating to their custody.” Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, supra note 4, pmbl., 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98.
32. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29; see also PÉREZ-VERA, supra note 15,
¶ 24, at 431 (“[T]he struggle against the great increase in international child abductions must
always be inspired by the desire to protect children . . . .”).
33. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29; see also Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 4, art. 3, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98–99 (defining
wrongful removal).
34. See infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.
35. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29–30; Linda Silberman, Patching Up the
Abduction Convention: A Call for a New International Protocol and a Suggestion for
Amendments to ICARA, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 41, 44 (2003).
36. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2006);
PÉREZ-VERA, supra note 15, ¶ 19, at 430.
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ultimate question of custody will be decided. By permitting the
judge in a Convention proceeding to decide only the limited question
of wrongful removal, rather than the broader question of custody, the
Convention prevents judges hearing abduction cases from allowing
their own subjective beliefs—a product of their own culture,
community, and country—to influence decisions that are better made
38
in the child’s country of habitual residence. The Convention’s sharp
focus on the sole question of wrongful removal was necessary to
change the mentality of judges accustomed to employing an
individualized,
best-interests-of-the-child
approach
whenever
39
confronted with disputes involving children.
B. Structure and Operation of the Convention
The Convention provides a civil remedy that enables left-behind
40
parents to obtain access to, or secure the return of, their wrongfully
41
removed or retained children. As long as the left-behind parent has
custodial rights and did not consent to the child’s relocation,
demonstrating a wrongful removal is not typically burdensome. First,
42
either a state or federal court must determine where the child was
43
“habitually resident” at the time of the removal. Second, the court
must determine whether the removal breached the custody rights of

37. See Silberman, supra note 35, at 44 (“The Convention remedy can best be thought of as
a ‘provisional’ remedy because it does nothing to dispose of the merits of the custody case.
Additional proceedings are generally contemplated in the state of the child's habitual residence
after the child is returned.”).
38. PÉREZ-VERA, supra note 15, ¶ 22, at 431.
39. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29. In contrast, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child provides that “[i]n all actions concerning children . . . the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration.” Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 3,
opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added).
40. This Note focuses on the return of children under the Convention and therefore does
not discuss rights of access. In any case, the vast majority of petitions under the Hague
Convention are for return, not access. See Lowe & Horosova, supra note 8, at 63 (noting that in
2003 there were 1369 return applications and only 250 access applications).
41. The term “children” is defined as minors less than sixteen years of age. Once a child
turns sixteen, the Convention no longer applies. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction, supra note 4, art. 4, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 99.
42. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 4(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2006).
43. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
4, art. 3(a), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98. Though the term “habitually resident” was left undefined by the
Convention, an extensive national and international jurisprudence has identified several factors
relevant to its determination. See KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING
& EXPLOITED CHILDREN, LITIGATING CHILD ABDUCTION CASES UNDER THE HAGUE
CONVENTION 12–13 (2007) (identifying factors that determine habitual residence).
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the left-behind parent and whether the left-behind parent was
44
exercising those rights at the time of the removal. If the left-behind
45
parent proves these elements by a preponderance of the evidence,
then the removal was wrongful. The burden then shifts to the
abducting parent to show why the court should nonetheless deny the
petition for the child’s return.
Faced with a prima facie case for return, the abducting parent
may plead any of five “discretionary exceptions” to resist the return
46
of the child: (1) the child has become “settled” in her new location
47
after at least a year; (2) the left-behind parent has consented to or
48
acquiesced in the removal; (3) the child, of sufficient age and
49
maturity, objects to the return; (4) the return would violate human
50
rights and fundamental freedoms; and (5) the return would expose
51
the child to “grave risk” of harm. Even if an abducting parent
successfully pleads an exception, discretion ultimately rests with the
52
judge whether to deny the return, allowing the child to stay. Thus,
although return is mandatory if the abducting parent cannot show
that an exception applies, return is discretionary when the abducting
parent successfully pleads an exception. All of the exceptions were
drawn narrowly so that they would not undermine the Convention’s
53
aim of returning children.

44. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
4, art. 3(a)–(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98–99.
45. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 4(e)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1)(A).
46. See Jeanine Lewis, Comment, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction: When Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Impact the Goal of
Comity, 13 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 391, 408 & n.153, 409 (2000) (noting that the phrase
“discretionary exception[]” accurately describes what are often termed “defenses” under the
Convention).
47. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
4, art. 12, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100.
48. Id. art. 13(a), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
49. Id. art. 13, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
50. Id. art. 20, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
51. Id. art. 13(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
52. See PÉREZ-VERA, supra note 15, ¶ 113, at 460 (“[T]he very nature of these exceptions
gives judges a discretion—and does not impose upon them a duty—to refuse to return a child in
certain circumstances.”).
53. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 135–38 (stating that the defenses were
“restrictively drafted” so that the Convention’s return mechanism would function effectively).
The existence of these exceptions demonstrates that, although deterring abduction is in the
collective interest of children, abduction may be justified, or return unacceptably harmful, in
some individual cases. See PÉREZ-VERA, supra note 15, ¶ 25, at 432 (“[I]t has to be admitted
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The last of these exceptions, contained in Article 13(b) of the
Convention, is commonly referred to as the grave-risk exception.
Article 13(b) states that a child’s return may be denied if “there is a
grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
54
situation.” Fleeing parents who allege domestic violence in
55
Convention proceedings most often rely on Article 13(b), and thus
its interpretation is key in balancing the rights of fleeing mothers and
left-behind fathers.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE UNDER THE CONVENTION
Worldwide, Article 13(b) is the most litigated of the
56
Convention’s five exceptions. At first blush, the disagreement about
the proper interpretation of Article 13(b) is somewhat curious:
Congress, the State Department, and the Convention’s drafters all
57
intended that Article 13(b) be interpreted narrowly. Indeed, the
13(b) exception “was not intended to be used by defendants as a
58
vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the child’s best interests”; it could
only be met by a grave risk, such as that implicated by child sexual
59
abuse. Otherwise, by providing an overly broad exception to the
Convention’s rule of return, Article 13(b) would undermine the

that the removal of the child can sometimes be justified by objective reasons which have to do
either with its person, or with the environment with which it is most closely connected.”).
54. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
4, art. 13(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
55. Roxanne Hoegger, What if She Leaves? Domestic Violence Cases Under the Hague
Convention and the Insufficiency of the Undertakings Remedy, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 181,
187 (2003).
56. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 161.
57. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4)
(2006) (“Children who are wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the
Convention are to be promptly returned unless one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the
Convention applies.”); Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,509 (Mar. 26, 1986) (“[I]t was generally believed that courts
would understand and fulfill the objectives of the Convention by narrowly interpreting the
exceptions . . . .”); BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 135–38 (noting that Article 13(b)
was drafted in an intentionally restrictive manner).
58. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 10,510. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “[t]he exception ‘is not license for a court in the
abducted-to country to speculate on where the child would be happiest.’” Cuellar v. Joyce, 596
F.3d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2005)).
59. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 10,510.
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Convention’s twin goals of deterring child abductions and returning
60
children swiftly.
The reason for the uncertainty surrounding Article 13(b)
becomes clearer, however, when one recognizes that the restrictive
approach to the grave-risk exception was adopted when the
prototypical abductor was believed to be a noncustodial male,
61
frustrated at being denied custody of his children. This belief does
not appear to reflect current reality. In 2003, the latest year for which
comprehensive statistics are available, 68 percent of all abductors
were female, and 85 percent of female abductors were primary or
62
joint-primary caretakers. At the same time, there is now both public
acknowledgement of and empirical support for the fact that some
custodial mothers who abduct their children are motivated by fears of
63
domestic violence. Although the reasons for this demographic shift
64
remain unclear, the drafters of the Convention likely did not
imagine this pronounced change in the profile of the average
65
abductor. Indeed, the Convention itself, its implementing legislation,
and the guidelines from the State Department do not mention
66
67
domestic violence. Thus, fleeing parents, typically mothers, are

60. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 135–39 (noting the difficulties in
drafting and interpreting Article 13(b) due to the sometimes-competing interests of children and
caretakers).
61. See id. at 8–9 (citing studies from the 1970s and 1980s indicating that between 71 and 75
percent of abductors were male).
62. Lowe & Horosova, supra note 8, at 67–68.
63. See Sudha Shetty & Jeffrey L. Edleson, Adult Domestic Violence in Cases of
International Parental Child Abduction, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 115, 120 (2005) (noting
that one-third of all Convention cases made reference to familial violence, and 70 percent of
those cases included reference to adult domestic violence); Weiner, supra note 7, at 611–14
(noting that the media and legislators started to become aware of the role of domestic violence
in motivating abductions, perhaps as a result of a greater public awareness of domestic-violence
issues generally, as early as 1993).
64. See, e.g., BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 10 (suggesting that the declining
percentage of male abductors could be due to the increased success of males who seek custody
rights, and who are thus no longer motivated to abduct, or to the stronger deterrent effect that
the Convention has on fathers).
65. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 162.
66. Admittedly, at least one delegate who helped draft the Convention considered the
situation of mothers fleeing domestic violence. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 136
(describing the United Kingdom delegate’s observation that the final phrase of Section 13(b)
was important to protect fleeing mothers). Yet this was not the paradigmatic case that the
Convention sought to address, and the Convention did not deal explicitly with the problem. See
id. at 135–36 (noting various other situations in which the final clause of Article 13(b) could be
invoked).
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asking courts to apply Article 13(b) to a situation that the Article’s
framers did not consider. Under these circumstances, disagreement as
to the application and scope of Article 13(b) is unsurprising.
The demographic shift in the identity of the typical child
abductor has prompted many scholars to call for an interpretation of
Article 13(b) that protects domestic-violence victims and their
68
children. And though they have not done so uniformly, many courts
have recognized that sufficient evidence of domestic violence—
directed solely at the fleeing parent—can be grounds to deny a
69
petition for return. These outcomes find support both in policy,
given the well-known effects of interparental violence on
70
children, and in the text of the Convention, in the “psychological
71
harm” component of Article 13(b). Despite what some scholars have
72
suggested, it is unnecessary to venture into novel interpretations of
Article 13(b) to meet the needs of domestic-violence victims. The
wiser course is for courts to seize upon the psychological harm
component of Article 13(b), as many have done, and to lighten, if
they have not already, a component of the evidentiary burden for
fleeing parents attempting to show grave risk. Doing so will allow

67. Either parent in an intimate relationship can perpetrate domestic violence. But the
common case under the Convention is violence by fathers against mothers, and thus this Note
focuses on that scenario. See Alanen, supra note 26, at 78 (noting that men who abduct their
children “[r]arely, if ever” claim domestic violence under the Article 13(b) grave-risk
exception).
68. See, e.g., Bruch, supra note 11, at 532–35 (arguing that a narrow interpretation of
Article 13(b) does little to protect domestic-violence victims or their children); Caldwell, supra
note 11, at 164 (noting that “a number of legal academics” advocate for a broader interpretation
of Article 13(b) that would protect domestic-violence victims); Weiner, supra note 7, at 704
(noting that courts have failed to appreciate how witnessing domestic violence should qualify as
“grave risk”).
69. Compare Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 460–61 (1st Cir. 2000) (ordering the return of
a child partly on the ground that the father’s physical and verbal abuse was directed at the
mother, not the child), with Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2008) (denying the
return of a child based on a grave risk of physical or psychological harm when the physical and
verbal abuse was directed primarily at the mother, not the child), Van De Sande v. Van De
Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570–72 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding a grave risk of harm when the violence was
directed solely at the abducting mother and only threats were made against the child), and
Miltiadous v. Tetervak, 686 F. Supp. 2d 544, 553–54 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (finding a grave risk of
harm based on spousal abuse).
70. See infra Part II.A.
71. See infra Part II.B.
72. Merle H. Weiner, Intolerable Situations and Counsel for Children: Following
Switzerland’s Example in Hague Abduction Cases, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 335, 348–52 (2008).
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domestic-violence victims to continue to use Article 13(b) effectively,
while not impinging on the rights of left-behind fathers.
A. Domestic Violence and its Effects on Children
It is widely accepted that interparental violence creates an
73
unhealthy environment for a child and heavily influences custody
74
determinations. But given that the Convention does not decide
issues of custody and provides only narrow discretionary exceptions
75
to the rule of return, it is not self-evident that interparental violence
should qualify as a grave risk of psychological harm under Article
13(b). Yet the enduring effects of interparental violence on children,
as well as the overlap between interparental violence and child abuse,
demonstrate that credible evidence of such violence meets the high
standard of grave risk.
Exposure to interparental violence has profound effects on
76
children’s development. Almost one hundred published studies have
demonstrated links between childhood exposure to interparental
violence and problematic behavior, either as a child or later as an
77
adult. Children exposed to interparental violence tend to exhibit
higher rates of depression, anxiety, aggression, and fighting than
78
children who are not exposed. Those children may also have a
difficult time focusing on schoolwork, thus hindering their intellectual

73. See B.B. ROBBIE ROSSMAN, HONORE M. HUGHES & MINDY S. ROSENBERG,
CHILDREN AND INTERPARENTAL VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF EXPOSURE 17–18 (2000)
(describing the negative effects of interparental violence on the emotional climate of the
family).
74. Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALI
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 5, 26 (2002) (noting that
“many states have a rebuttable presumption against an award of joint custody if domestic
violence has occurred, and many of these states also presume that an award of sole custody to a
perpetrator of domestic abuse is not in the child’s best interests”).
75. See supra notes 33–35, 57–59 and accompanying text.
76. Katherine M. Kitzmann, Noni K. Gaylord, Aimee R. Holt & Erin D. Kenny, Child
Witnesses to Domestic Violence: A Meta-Analytic Review, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 339, 347 (2003) (“Overall, the results of the current meta-analysis provided robust
evidence that exposure to interparental aggression is associated with significant disruptions in
children’s psychosocial functioning, at least in the short term.”).
77. Shetty & Edleson, supra note 63, at 126 (listing studies documenting the present and
future effects of domestic violence on children).
78. John W. Fantuzzo & Wanda K. Mohr, Prevalence and Effects of Child Exposure to
Domestic Violence, FUTURE CHILD., Winter 1999, at 21, 27; Kitzmann et al., supra note 76, at
345 (noting that “about 63% of child witnesses . . . far[ed] more poorly than the average child
who had not been exposed to interparental violence”).
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79

development. Even infants who witness interparental violence may
exhibit measurably higher levels of stress, as well as severe
80
attachment problems to the abused parent—typically the mother.
Moreover, violence in a male’s family is the single strongest
81
predictor of abuse in later adult relationships. The cycle-of-violence
theory posits that children who are exposed to violence are more
82
likely to perpetrate violence themselves. Specifically, scholars have
demonstrated that exposure to violence during childhood predicts the
development of negative ideas about gender and interpersonal
violence, which in turn predicts the use of violence by boys when they
83
become adults. As a result, battering rates are three times higher
84
among men who witnessed interparental violence as children.
Finally, children may carry with them the effects of violence in
85
the form of anxiety and distress long after the violence has subsided.
Witnessing interparental violence in childhood has been linked to
86
poorer adult social adjustment and higher rates of adult depression.
Thus, merely removing the child from the violent situation may not
be sufficient to end its harmful effects.
In addition to the well-documented psychological effects of
abuse, there is “considerable overlap” between interparental violence
87
and child abuse. One analysis, which collected studies reviewing the
relationship between partner-directed and child-directed violence,

79. Fantuzzo & Mohr, supra note 78, at 27.
80. PETER G. JAFFE, NANCY K. D. LEMON & SAMANTHA E. POISSON, CHILD CUSTODY
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A CALL FOR SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 25 (2003) (noting the
physical responses of infants who witness domestic violence); G. Anne Bogat, Erika DeJonghe,
Alytia A. Levendosky, William S. Davidson & Alexander von Eye, Trauma Symptoms Among
Infants Exposed to Intimate Partner Violence, 30 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 109, 119–21 (2006)
(finding that nearly half of infants exposed to intimate partner violence had at least one trauma
symptom).
81. Deborah Reitzel-Jaffe & David A. Wolfe, Predictors of Relationship Abuse Among
Young Men, 16 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 99, 108 (2001) (“[S]tudies have for many years
found violence in one’s family of origin to be the most consistent indicator of abuse in men’s
adult relationships.”).
82. JAFFE ET AL., supra note 80, at 27.
83. Reitzel-Jaffe & Wolfe, supra note 81, at 108.
84. Id. at 101.
85. JAFFE ET AL., supra note 80, at 29–30 (noting that even if there is no threat of present
violence, “any association with the past . . . can create significant anxiety and distress” among
children who have witnessed domestic violence).
86. Id. at 26–27.
87. Anne E. Appel & George W. Holden, The Co-Occurrence of Spouse and Physical
Child Abuse: A Review and Appraisal, 12 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 578, 596 (1998).
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88

found an average co-occurrence of 41 percent; other studies have
89
found a co-occurrence of between 30 percent and 60 percent. Thus,
when one parent violently abuses the other, there is a strong
possibility that the child is also subject to abuse—a fact that some
courts have seized upon to buttress their refusals to return children
90
under Article 13(b).
Courts must make individualized findings in each Convention
case as to whether there is “specific evidence” of grave risk of harm to
91
the child upon return; they may not rely merely on studies and
statistics to make Article 13(b) determinations. Nonetheless, the data
suggest that when there is evidence of serious interparental violence,
judges are on firm ground in refusing returns based on grave risk.
Article 13(b) remains a high bar. But the documented effects on
children of witnessing interparental violence and the overlap of
interparental violence and child abuse allow courts, when presented
with sufficient evidence, to confidently refuse return even when the
92
violence is strictly interparental.
B. The Meaning of Psychological Harm under Article 13(b)
Even though the Convention does not use the phrase “domestic
violence,” its language is broad enough to meet the needs of
domestic-violence victims and their children. Article 13(b) states that
the return of a child may be denied if “[t]here is a grave risk that [the
child’s] return would expose the child to physical or psychological
93
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” It is
the psychological harm component that provides the strongest textual
support for protecting victims of violence and their children.

88. Id. at 581.
89. Jeffrey L. Edleson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Woman Battering, 5
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134, 136 (1999).
90. E.g., Tsarbopoulos v. Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1057–58 (E.D. Wash. 2001)
(“Spousal abuse, found by the Court in this case, is a factor to be considered in the
determination of whether or not the Article 13(b) exception applies because of the potential
that the abuser will also abuse the child.”).
91. Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005).
92. E.g., Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding grave risk and refusing
to return a child based partially on the grounds that “children are at increased risk of physical
and psychological injury themselves when they are in contact with a spousal abuser” and that
there is a well-documented overlap between partner and child abuse).
93. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
4, art. 13(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101 (emphasis added).
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Many courts have recognized the crucial link between exposure
94
to domestic violence and psychological harm. In Baran v. Beaty, the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s refusal to return a child to
Australia, even though there was no evidence that the abusive father
95
had ever intentionally harmed the child. That the father had been
verbally and physically abusive toward the mother was sufficient to
show that there would be a grave risk of harm if the child were
96
97
returned. Similarly, in Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, the Seventh
Circuit reversed a lower court’s return order, noting that the lower
court had been “unduly influenced” by the fact that most of the abuse
98
was directed at the mother, not the children. Finally, in Walsh v.
99
Walsh, the First Circuit found that the father’s history of domestic
violence constituted a grave risk of harm, even though the child was
100
only witness to, not the target of, the violence.
Nonetheless, as Professor Merle Weiner observes, “[s]ome courts
are unable to appreciate the connection between domestic violence
against the parent and the physical or psychological well-being of the
101
child.” Weiner posits that one solution is to breathe life into the
102
“intolerable situation” language of Article 13(b). She notes that
U.S. courts focus unduly on the restrictive grave risk of physical or
103
psychological harm components of Article 13(b) and urges courts to
seize upon the pliable “intolerable situation” language to deny return
104
in cases of interparental violence.
This argument misses the mark. First, there is a risk that
“intolerable situation,” a phrase whose content is still undefined by
American case law, will create an unacceptably broad exception to
the Convention. In some foreign jurisdictions, courts have interpreted

94. Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2008).
95. Id. at 1346.
96. Id.
97. Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2005).
98. Id. at 570.
99. Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204 (1st Cir. 2000).
100. Id. at 220.
101. Weiner, supra note 72, at 356; see also id. at 356 n.94 (citing federal district court cases
in which domestic violence was considered irrelevant to the question of grave risk).
102. Id. at 345–52.
103. Id. at 345–46. It is widely acknowledged that courts tend to conflate the Article 13(b)
exceptions. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 139 & n.32 (noting that courts often
combine the Article 13(b) exceptions and citing examples).
104. Weiner, supra note 72, at 356.
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105

“intolerable situation” in so sweeping a manner as to undercut the
Convention’s purpose of deterring child abduction by providing for
106
the swift return of abducted children. In the same vein, a recent
107
revision to Swiss law defines “intolerable situation” quite broadly,
allowing Swiss judges to refuse return when it is “manifestly not in the
108
child’s best interests,” a standard that does not rise to the level of
109
grave risk. This best-interest standard permits an abducting parent
to use newfound ties in the destination country—such as having
110
recently given birth or gotten married—to resist a return order.
Such a broad interpretation of Article 13(b) allows courts to consider

105. See, e.g., P.F. v. M.F., [Jan. 13, 1993] S.C. (Ir.) (unreported), available at http://www.
hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0102.htm (finding that a father’s financial irresponsibility was evidence
that the children would be placed in an intolerable situation if returned, and denying the father’s
petition partly on that ground); In re O (Child Abduction: Undertakings), [1994] 2 Fam. 349
(U.K.) (noting that a disruption in the children’s customary lifestyle could result in an
intolerable situation).
106. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 153 (criticizing an impermissibly broad
interpretation of “intolerable situation”).
107. Loi fédérale sur l’enlèvement international d’enfants et les Conventions de La Haye
sur la protection des enfants et des adultes [LF-EEA] [Federal Act on International Child
Abduction and the Hague Conventions on the Protection of Children and Adults] Dec. 21,
2007, RS 211.222.32 (Switz.), available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/211_222_32/index.html,
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/2/211.222.32.en.pdf (unofficial English translation).
108. Andreas Bucher, The New Swiss Federal Act on International Child Abduction, 4 J.
PRIVATE INT’L L. 139, 162 (2008).
109. The new legislation alters the traditional, restrictive grave-risk-of-harm inquiry by
defining “intolerable situation” according to a broad three-part conjunctive test: whether a
return would be “manifestly [contrary to] the child’s best interests,” whether the abducting
parent cannot “reasonably be required” to return to the country of origin, and whether
temporary “placement in foster care [would be] manifestly [contrary to] the child’s best
interests.” See id. at 162–63 (reprinting the text of the Swiss legislation). This definition of
“intolerable situation” has the potential to expand broadly the scope of Article 13(b). First,
according to Professor Andreas Bucher, an advocate of the law, the legislation allows judges to
take into account the newfound ties of a fleeing parent to the destination country. Id. at 158. But
considering these ties cuts against the spirit of the Convention, which allows judges to evaluate
only whether a child has become well settled, and then only after one year. See Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note 4, art. 12, 1343
U.N.T.S. at 100 (establishing that judges can consider the child well settled in the new
environment if more than a year passed between the abduction and the filing of the Convention
petition). Second, Bucher argues that taking a child away from the primary caretaker and
placing the child in foster care for the purposes of litigating a custody dispute could only be
considered in “utterly exceptional circumstances.” Bucher, supra note 108, at 159. Thus, under
Bucher’s analysis, the third part of the “intolerable situation” test rings hollow, given that
temporary placement in foster care would almost always be manifestly contrary to the child’s
best interests.
110. Bucher, supra note 108, at 158.
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factors better suited to a custody dispute, entailing far-reaching
111
consequences for left-behind fathers.
Second, even if fears of a loose interpretation of “intolerable
112
situation” are overblown, it is simply not necessary to parse the
language of the Convention to protect children from the effects of
interparental violence. The Convention explicitly allows judges to
refuse returning a child to a situation in which there is a grave risk of
113
psychological harm. If courts fail to appreciate the link between
interparental violence and psychological harm to children, then there
is a need for more education on the psychological effects caused y
exposure to interparental violence, not a need for creating a new
114
exception to the Convention or invigorating a seldom-used one.
Victims of spousal abuse, in addition to providing evidence of the
abuse itself, must emphasize the abundant scientific literature
describing the psychological harm to children who are exposed to
interparental violence. As previously noted, several circuits have

111. See infra Part III.B.1–3.
112. See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 140 (noting that Article 13(b) is
“without doubt the most strictly regulated of all of the exceptions and has been upheld in only a
handful of cases” (footnotes omitted)). In addition, contracting states evidenced their intent to
interpret Article 13(b) narrowly by recently rejecting a Swiss amendment that would have
broadened the Convention’s Article 13(b) exceptions. See PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, REPORT ON THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE SPECIAL
COMMISSION TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980
ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION AND THE PRACTICAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 19 OCTOBER 1996 ON JURISDICTION,
APPLICABLE LAW, RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF
PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN ¶¶ 163–165,
at 45–46 (2007), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd_2006_rpt-e.pdf (“A majority
of experts also insisted that the Article 13(1) b) exception should be interpreted narrowly and
cautioned that the Swiss proposal created an additional ground for refusal . . . .”). Notably, the
Swiss Parliament later adopted a national law similar to what Switzerland proposed. Weiner,
supra note 72, at 339, 343.
113. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
4, art. 13(b), 1343 U.N.T.S. at 101.
114. The Special Commission to Review the Operation of the Hague Convention, at its
most recent meeting of contracting states, feared “that the Swiss proposal created an additional
ground for refusal.” See PERMANENT BUREAU, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW,
supra note 112, ¶ 165, at 46 (emphasis added). Although it is not typically necessary to rely on
the “intolerable situation” language of Article 13(b) in interparental violence cases, courts could
rely on this language in at least some other cases. See id. ¶ 166, at 46 (acknowledging that the
phrase “intolerable situation” could be used in cases “where the return of a child would not
necessarily create a grave risk, but where it would still be inappropriate to order the return”).
Some authors have suggested that an intolerable situation could arise, for example, in the case
of separation of siblings. Weiner, supra note 72, at 348.

BROWNE IN PRINTER PROOF

2011]

1/14/2011 1:02:54 PM

RELEVANCE AND FAIRNESS

1211
115

refused to return children based on interparental violence. Courts
should draw upon the “psychological harm” language in the
Convention to recognize the effects of interparental violence on
children.
C. An Adjustment to the Fleeing Parent’s Evidentiary Burden
In addition to appreciating the link between interparental
violence and psychological harm to children, an adjustment to the
fleeing parent’s burden to show grave risk under Article 13(b) would
ensure that proving grave risk is not unduly burdensome. In some
circuits, fleeing parents who claim to have been victims of domestic
violence must show by clear and convincing evidence that the country
to which the child would be returned is unable or unwilling to protect
116
the child. Thus, to succeed under Article 13(b), domestic-violence
victims must gather evidence showing that the country of origin
would fail to protect the child upon return. Though technically dicta,
117
this formulation has been repeated by other circuits. The effect of
this requirement is to make it more difficult for fleeing parents to
118
establish Article 13(b) exceptions. At first glance, this approach
seems reasonable: it reflects the view that American courts trust—or
ought to trust—that courts in other contracting states are equally
119
capable of protecting children, unless proven otherwise. Such trust,
it might be said, lies at the heart of international comity.
Yet this evidentiary requirement is unnecessary and
burdensome, and it does little to further international comity. First, as
other circuits have recognized, neither the Convention nor its
115. See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text.
116. See In re Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 395 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that the abductor must show
that courts in the country of habitual residence are unable or unwilling to protect the child);
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1069 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e believe that a grave risk of
harm for the purposes of the Convention can exist in only two situations. First, there is a grave
risk of harm when return of the child puts the child in imminent danger prior to the resolution
of the custody dispute . . . . Second, there is a grave risk of harm in cases of serious abuse or
neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual
residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate
protection.” (second emphasis added)).
117. See, e.g., Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting with approval the
requirement that the abductor must show that the country of habitual residence is unable or
unwilling to protect the child).
118. See Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068 (“When we trust the court system in the abducted-from
country, the vast majority of claims of harm [under Article 13(b)] . . . evaporate.”).
119. See id. (“[W]e acknowledge that courts in the abducted-from country are as ready and
able as we are to protect children.”).
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implementing legislation mandate the examination of foreign legal
120
systems. Second, requiring the abductor to put forth such evidence
creates difficult problems of proof, as the evidence of systemic
deficiencies is most readily available in the country from which the
121
abductor fled. And third, finding grave risk without inquiring into
the capacities of foreign legal systems does not offend any principle of
international comity. As Judge Richard Posner has written, “If
handing over custody of a child to an abusive parent creates a grave
risk of harm to the child, . . . the child should not be handed over,
however severely the law of the parent’s country might punish such
122
behavior.” To acknowledge that even the most robust and wellresourced legal systems suffer from enforcement gaps is not to
123
denigrate mutual trust and comity; it is simply to embrace reality.
Thus, a fleeing parent who seeks to demonstrate that returning a child
would create a grave risk of psychological harm should not carry the
additional burden of demonstrating systemic deficiencies.
D. An Example of How Article 13(b) Protects DomesticViolence Victims
By recognizing the well-known effects of interparental violence
on children and by relieving the fleeing parent of the burden to show
systemic weaknesses, courts have successfully used Article 13(b) to
deny petitions for return in cases of interparental violence. Contrary
124
to what some scholars have urged, it has not been necessary to
create new or dust off seldom-used exceptions to the Convention.
The Eleventh Circuit case of Baran v. Beaty exemplifies how Article
125
13(b) is sufficiently protective of domestic-violence victims.

120. See Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining “to impose on a
responding parent a duty to prove that her child’s country of habitual residence is unable or
unwilling to ameliorate the grave risk of harm”); Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567,
571 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o define the issue not as whether there is a grave risk of harm, but as
whether the lawful custodian’s country has good laws or even as whether it both has and
zealously enforces such laws, disregards the language of the Convention and its implementing
statute; for they say nothing about the laws in the petitioning parent’s country.”).
121. Baran, 526 F.3d at 1348.
122. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d at 571.
123. Id. at 570–71 (“There is a difference between the law on the books and the law as it is
actually applied, and nowhere is the difference as great as in domestic relations.”).
124. See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
125. Baran, 526 F.3d at 1352.
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An Australian father, Mr. Baran, petitioned for the return of his
126
son Samuel from the United States. Ms. Beaty, Samuel’s mother,
conceded that she had wrongfully removed Samuel but argued that
127
returning him would pose a grave risk under Article 13(b). Beaty
claimed that Baran had a severe alcohol problem and that he
physically and verbally abused her during her pregnancy with Samuel
128
and, after she gave birth, in Samuel’s presence.
The district court sided with Beaty, ruling that returning Samuel
129
to Australia would pose a grave risk of harm. Baran appealed,
arguing that he had never abused Samuel, and that grave risk could
only be shown if there was evidence of violence toward the child, not
130
just the mother. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. It found that the
evidence of psychological and physical harm to Beaty created a grave
131
risk of harm to Samuel upon his return. The court explicitly noted
that it was irrelevant that there was no evidence of intentional abuse
132
of Samuel; the effects of witnessing his mother’s abuse would have
created a grave risk if Samuel had been returned to his father. In
making its decision, the court did not find it necessary to read deeply
133
into the “intolerable situation” language of 13(b). And the court did
not require Beaty to adduce evidence regarding the state of social
services in Australia, recognizing that so doing would create difficult
134
problems of proof. Accordingly, Baran v. Beaty exemplifies how
Article 13(b) has been used appropriately to protect domesticviolence victims, and how the Convention has adapted to fit the
modern-day context.
III. LEFT-BEHIND FATHERS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Although Article 13(b) was drafted when most child abductors
were fathers and before domestic violence was a salient public
135
concern, it has been interpreted to protect victims of domestic
126.
127.
128.
2007)).
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 1341–42.
Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1345–46 (quoting Baran v. Beaty, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1270–71 (S.D. Ala.
Baran, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 1275–76.
Baran, 526 F.3d at 1346.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 106–07.
Baran, 526 F.3d at 1348.
See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
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violence and their children. When interpreting Article 13(b),
however, it is crucial to bear in mind that there is another
136
constituency whose rights merit protection—left-behind fathers. An
overbroad interpretation of Article 13(b) would not only undercut
the Convention’s twin goals of deterring child abduction and swiftly
137
returning abducted children, it would also jeopardize the rights of
left-behind fathers.
Left-behind fathers face significant challenges litigating in the
United States under the Convention, both in securing legal
representation and in litigating their cases once they have
representation. Allegations of domestic violence exacerbate these
challenges. As many left-behind fathers contend, once domesticviolence allegations are made against them, their “rights and
remedies seem abruptly to dissolve as system actors become
138
complacent or even facilitate the kidnapper.” The odds, they feel,
are against them from the moment of the abduction.
The disadvantages faced by left-behind fathers will become only
more pronounced if Article 13(b) is not interpreted with care. An
unhinged interpretation of Article 13(b)—one that is not grounded in
specific evidence of a grave risk of psychological harm upon return—
will increase the potential for Convention proceedings to assume the
attributes of traditional custody contests. Inquiries regarding the
child’s best interests or who would be the better custodial parent,
irrelevant in Convention disputes, would become relevant if not
139
determinative. This risk is real: at least one contracting state has

136. This discussion focuses on left-behind fathers, not left-behind parents generally,
because the majority of left-behind parents are fathers. Lowe & Horosova, supra note 8, at 67.
Further, Article 13(b) exceptions based on interparental violence are almost exclusively
asserted by mothers against fathers—meaning that the parties faced with countering domesticviolence allegations are predominantly left-behind fathers. See Alanen, supra note 26, at 78
(noting that men who abduct their children “[r]arely, if ever” claim domestic violence under the
Article 13(b) grave-risk exception). This does not mean that men are not victims of domestic
violence, but only that they do not make allegations of domestic violence in Convention cases.
137. See supra notes 60–72 and accompanying text.
138. Alanen, supra note 26, at 73. There is evidence that some fathers feel this way in the
national context, as well. See JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, DEFIANT DADS: FATHERS’ RIGHTS
ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA 159 (2008) (describing how, in the domestic context, some fathers feel
that once an allegation is made, they “can do little to protect themselves from the resulting
quagmire of investigations from law enforcement and social service agencies”).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 37–38. Grave-risk inquiries and custodial
determinations are markedly distinct. See Foster v. Foster, 654 F. Supp. 2d 348, 362 (W.D. Pa.
2009) (“It is important to stress that, under the Hague Convention, I am not charged . . . with
resolving issues germane to a custody dispute. If I were, this would be in basketball parlance, a
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passed legislation that broadens the Article 13(b) inquiry to include at
140
least some elements of a custody determination. And as some
circuit court decisions demonstrate, it is only through careful and
constant policing of Article 13(b)’s interpretation by district courts
that the lines between Convention disputes and custody disputes
141
remain distinct.
Admittedly, because Convention proceedings do not determine
custody, left-behind fathers who do not prevail in their Convention
cases can still litigate to obtain custody of their children. Yet the
stakes for a left-behind father in a Convention case are nonetheless
high. When a judge refuses a child’s return on grounds of grave risk of
harm due to domestic violence—whether warranted or not—a leftbehind father will have to fight for custody rights in a foreign
jurisdiction that has already found allegations against him credible.
Whatever difficulties the father faced during the Convention
proceeding will only become more formidable during a subsequent
custody proceeding. For instance, although a foreign left-behind
father is eligible for free legal assistance in Convention cases, he is
142
not eligible for such assistance in custody cases. Further, a leftbehind father litigating for custody in the United States will confront
stereotypes that continue to mark traditional custody disputes—
143
stereotypes that the Supreme Court has failed to roundly reject. A
finding of grave risk in a Convention proceeding can thus have a great
impact on the ultimate custody determination.
Although interpreting the grave-risk exception under Article
13(b) to protect victims of domestic violence is a welcome
development, an overly broad interpretation threatens to undermine
the legitimate rights and interests of left-behind fathers, whether or

‘slam dunk.’”). Yet if these inquiries are blurred, evidence that is relevant to custody would also
be admitted to resist return petitions.
140. New Swiss legislation allows for a refusal of return when return would be “manifestly
not in the child’s best interests” and permits an abducting parent to use newfound ties in the
abducted-to country to resist a return order. Weiner, supra note 72, at 343; see also supra notes
111–14 and accompanying text.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 197–208.
142. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 1626.10(e) (2009) (establishing that a foreign national who files a
Convention petition is eligible for legal aid), with id. § 1626.5 (2009) (setting forth an exhaustive
list of categories of foreign nationals who are eligible for legal aid services, which does not
include foreign parents seeking custody).
143. See infra Part III.B.2–4.

BROWNE IN PRINTER PROOF

1216

1/14/2011 1:02:54 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1193

144

not they are guilty of domestic violence. To strike the proper
balance, judges must be sensitive to the precarious situation of leftbehind fathers. In this vein, judges should consider the domestic legal
framework that governs child abductions between U.S. states—a
framework that preserves the rights of left-behind fathers more fully
145
than the Convention.
A. Logistical Hurdles of Litigating a Convention Case in the
United States
1. Challenges Faced by All Left-Behind Parents. Foreign leftbehind parents litigating their Convention cases in the United States
face considerable cost-related and logistical challenges. Although
Article 26 of the Convention provides that contracting states cannot
require the left-behind parent to pay legal fees incurred as a result of
146
litigation under the Convention, the United States has opted out of
147
this provision. Left-behind parents without means to pay legal fees
in Convention cases in the United States must rely on legal aid or
148
other pro bono legal services, which may, but are not required to,
149
assist them. Although cost may be an issue for both parents, it is the
left-behind parent who bears the initial burden of filing a petition in
court through an attorney. And the left-behind parent must do so
within one year; otherwise, he opens himself to an argument that the

144. Left-behind fathers who are correctly found to present a grave risk to their children
may not evoke sympathy, but even convicted batterers deserve to “have a competent court
determine the nature and extent of the parent-child relationship.” Alanen, supra note 26, at 84.
This determination could range from court-mandated anger-management therapy to a
termination of parental rights. Id. Custody rights, which come in various shapes and sizes, do
not automatically dissolve simply because one parent is abusive. Id.
145. See infra Part III.C.
146. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
4, art. 26, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 102.
147. See International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 8(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(1)
(2006) (establishing that the United States bears no responsibility for the legal costs of the leftbehind parent).
148. See id. § 8(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(2) (requiring that left-behind parents bear the
costs of litigating Convention cases, unless legal aid covers the costs).
149. Publicly funded legal aid services are permitted to represent litigants under the
Convention, even if they are not American citizens. But legal aid services are not required to do
so. 45 C.F.R. § 1626.10(e) (2009).
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child has become “settled in its new environment,” making his case
151
that much more difficult.
That the United States has entered a reservation to Article 26
152
and otherwise has no comprehensive legal aid system places
applicants whose children have been abducted into the United States
at a serious disadvantage. This disadvantage is exacerbated by the
fact that half of all incoming cases in 2009 originated in countries with
modest levels of economic development. In 2009, there were 324 new
incoming Convention cases, representing 486 children abducted into
153
the United States. Of these 324 cases, 156 (or 48 percent) originated
from countries in which the per capita Gross Domestic Product
154
(GDP) is less than twelve thousand dollars. At the same time, the
cost of litigating a Convention case can range from forty-five to fifty155
five thousand dollars, not including the cost of an appeal. Thus,
most applicants from countries with lower levels of economic
development will simply be unable to litigate their cases without

150. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
4, art. 12, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 100. Often called the “well-settled defense,” this exception is only
available in cases in which the child has been removed for more than a year. KILPATRICK
STOCKTON LLP, supra note 43, at 41. Courts have determined that tolling begins when the
petition is filed in court, not merely when it is submitted to the Central Authority, making the
task of obtaining counsel to file the petition within one year from the date of abduction an
urgent matter. See Muhlenkamp v. Blizzard, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1152 (E.D. Wash. 2007)
(establishing that tolling begins when the petition is filed in court).
151. These cases are more difficult due to both the availability of the “well-settled defense”
and the fact that fleeing parents must only demonstrate that the child has become well-settled
by a preponderance of the evidence. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 4(e)(2)(B),
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B).
152. Silberman, supra note 35, at 60.
153. OFFICE OF CHILDREN’S ISSUES, supra note 5, at 68.
154. Countries that are contracting states to the Convention, that were sources of new
incoming Convention applications in 2009, and in which the GDP per capita is less than twelve
thousand dollars, include Argentina, Belize, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Macedonia,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, South Africa, Turkey, Venezuela, Ukraine, and Uruguay. Compare id.
(listing all contracting states that filed new incoming applications in 2009), with Social
Indicators: Indicators on Income and Economic Activity, UNITED NATIONS STAT. DIVISION,
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/socind/inc-eco.htm (last updated June 2010)
(listing the GDP per capita of all countries in 2008).
155. Telephone Interview with Stephanie P. Cassano, Former Legal Projects Coordinator,
Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children (Nov. 23, 2009). For four and a half years,
Stephanie Cassano was responsible for placing incoming Convention cases with pro bono
attorneys in the United States. This figure represents Cassano’s conversations with pro bono
coordinators at large law firms accustomed to taking on Convention cases.
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156

substantial legal assistance. International family law expert Stephen
Cullen remarks that obtaining competent, affordable legal
representation is the biggest challenge that left-behind parents face
157
when litigating their cases in the United States. The lack of legal aid
158
can dishearten a left-behind parent and has been the subject of
159
criticism from abroad. Attempts to increase funding to legal aid
organizations and private attorneys willing to take on Convention
160
cases have stalled in Congress.
Thus, although the American media seizes upon high-profile
cases in which parents have shelled out hundreds of thousands of
161
dollars to litigate their Convention disputes, the more typical case
involves a left-behind parent from a country outside the United States
162
who cannot afford to obtain American counsel. In contrast, many
other contracting states, comparable to the United States in economic
development, offer free, comprehensive legal assistance for leftbehind parents. For example, the United Kingdom, despite having
entered a reservation to Article 26, provides counsel through legal aid
163
without means or merits testing. Similarly, Australia, New Zealand,
164
and Ireland provide free legal aid to Convention applicants.

156. In the author’s experience, the vast majority of applicants from Mexico and South
America are unable to pay for legal services.
157. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen, Principal, and Kelly A. Powers, Associate,
Miles & Stockbridge, P.C. (Nov. 4, 2009). Cullen has been litigating international child
abduction cases for twenty years and is attorney adviser to the United States Delegation to the
Hague Special Commission.
158. FREEMAN, supra note 28, at 42.
159. See, e.g., BLANCA GÓMEZ BENGOECHEA, ASPECTOS CIVILES DE LA SUSTRACCIÓN
INTERNACIONAL DE MENORES: PROBLEMAS DE APLICACIÓN DEL CONVENIO DE LA HAYA DE
25 DE OCTUBRE 1980, at 128–30 (2003) (noting that the combination of a lack of comprehensive
legal aid and the Article 26 reservation is particularly problematic for applicants whose children
are abducted into the United States).
160. For example, a bill introduced in the House in 2008 would have created a program to
provide funding to those willing to take on Convention cases. At the time of publication of this
Note, there has been no action upon this bill since July 28, 2008. International and Parental
Child Abduction Remedies Assistance Act, H.R. 6095, 110th Cong. § 4(a) (2008).
161. The case of Sean Goldman, who was only recently returned to his father in the United
States after a five-year retention in Brazil, attracted considerable media attention. See supra
note 6. Sean’s father reports spending over four hundred thousand dollars in litigation costs.
BRING SEAN HOME FOUND., http://bringseanhome.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (soliciting
donations to cover Sean’s father’s legal costs).
162. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen & Kelly A. Powers, supra note 157.
163. Silberman, supra note 35, at 60 & n.126 (noting the Article 26 reservation of the United
Kingdom); International Parental Child Abduction: United Kingdom, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, http://travel.state.gov/abduction/country/country_533.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011)
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Once they secure legal representation, left-behind parents may
continue to find themselves at a disadvantage due to geography. It
can be difficult, costly, and sometimes impossible for left-behind
parents to travel to the United States for a Convention hearing.
Although the presence of the left-behind parent is not required by the
Convention, attorneys typically try to have their client travel to the
United States if possible. As Cullen remarks, “[w]e always try
somehow to get the [left-behind parent] here. But the judges are not
just used to doing this all under the affidavit. In most other countries,
165
it’s all done by affidavit.” The United States is indeed an outlier in
this regard. In the United Kingdom and New Zealand, for instance, it
is “commonly accepted” that evidence will be submitted in affidavit
form, and left-behind parents would “certainly not be expected to
166
travel abroad” for the purposes of a Convention hearing. American
judges, in contrast, are accustomed to seeing both parties before
them. And though some judges may be amenable to telephonic or
satellite testimony, many state judges lack the resources to take
167
remote testimony. Thus, left-behind parents and their attorneys
168
must coordinate to arrange travel to the United States. If the leftbehind parent is fortunate enough to be represented by a law firm
providing pro bono representation, then the firm may cover travel
169
expenses; if not, the left-behind parent may not be able to afford the
cost of travel. Additionally, the left-behind parent may face
immigration barriers that make travel to the United States
170
impossible.

(noting that the United Kingdom provides free legal assistance for return petitions under the
Convention).
164. International Parental Child Abduction: Australia, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://
travel.state.gov/abduction/country/country_507.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011); International
Parental Child Abduction: New Zealand, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/
abduction/country/country_1477.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011); International Parental Child
Abduction: Republic of Ireland, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/abduction/
country/country_499.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).
165. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen & Kelly A. Powers, supra note 157.
166. Caldwell, supra note 11, at 186.
167. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen & Kelly A. Powers, supra note 157.
168. KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP, supra note 43, at 91–93 (outlining the logistics of
arranging travel to the United States for left-behind parents).
169. Id. at 92.
170. In the author’s experience, it is not uncommon that left-behind parents have previously
entered the United States illegally and are therefore unable to procure a tourist visa to attend
the hearing. Furthermore, the Convention does not require that a contracting state admit a leftbehind parent, even if only for the purposes of attending a Convention hearing. Possible
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2. Specific Challenges Faced by Left-Behind Fathers. Though all
left-behind parents face challenges when litigating in the United
States, left-behind fathers face additional, unique logistical obstacles.
For example, even when legal aid is potentially available, pro bono
counsel are frequently disinclined to litigate on behalf of a client
171
accused of domestic violence. Large, well-resourced law firms that
routinely consider taking on Convention cases often decline those
involving domestic-violence allegations because expected public
172
relations or marketing benefits might not accrue. Moreover, cases
that involve allegations of domestic violence, if decided in favor of the
left-behind father, are likely to be appealed—making these cases
more expensive for, and thus less attractive to, pro bono counsel who
173
might otherwise be interested. The Office of Children’s Issues at the
State Department maintains a list of attorneys with experience in
Convention cases who may be willing to work on a free or reduced174
175
fee basis, but it does not actively place cases with attorneys. Thus,
women who abduct their children into the United States likely enjoy
a comparative resource advantage, especially given the network of
176
agencies that assist women in cases of domestic violence.
Further, it is common for abducting parents to devalue the
importance of the left-behind parent in the child’s life—perhaps even
more common than for parents locked into a traditional custody

Solutions—Using the Hague Abduction Convention, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://travel
.state.gov/abduction/solutions/hagueconvention/hagueconvention_3854.html (last visited Jan. 9,
2011) (“The Convention does not confer any immigration benefit. Anyone seeking to enter the
United States who is not a United States citizen must fulfill the appropriate entry
requirements . . . .”).
171. Telephone Interview with Stephanie P. Cassano, supra note 155.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Finding an Attorney, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/abduction/
incoming/legalaid/legalaid_4309.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).
175. See 22 C.F.R. § 94.6(e) (2010) (noting that the State Department may “[a]ssist
applicants in securing information useful for choosing or obtaining legal representation, for
example, by providing a directory of lawyer referral services, or pro bono listing published by
legal professional organizations”).
176. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen & Kelly A. Powers, supra note 157. In
Cullen’s experience, abducting mothers who make accusations of domestic violence are typically
able to find legal aid “immediately,” whereas left-behind fathers are not able to do so. Id. For
example, the National Domestic Violence Hotline, in operation twenty-four hours a day,
provides referrals to agencies in all fifty states for those who allege domestic violence. NAT’L
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.thehotline.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).
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177

battle. One commentator has even suggested that “a parent, by the
very act of abduction, is likely to be at significantly increased risk to
make false and unrealistic allegations that the other parent poses
178
potential harm to the child.” Whether or not unsubstantiated claims
179
are more likely in the abduction context is uncertain; what is clear is
that without legal aid, many left-behind fathers are left to contest
domestic violence allegations on their own. And if a father loses a
Convention hearing on domestic-violence grounds, his chances of
gaining even limited rights during a custody proceeding drop
precipitously, because whatever obstacles he faced in the Convention
context will only loom larger in the custody context. For example,
although obtaining legal aid services may be difficult, a foreign leftbehind father is at least permitted to receive such aid for the purposes
of a Convention hearing; he is not permitted to receive legal aid
180
services, however, for the purposes of a custody proceeding. Thus,
although all foreign left-behind parents face logistical hurdles in
litigating the Convention cases, fathers confront unique challenges,
especially when they are accused of domestic violence.
B. Gender Stereotyping
Article 13(b) permits only a restricted inquiry—whether there is
181
“specific evidence” of a grave risk of harm to the child upon return.
It is not an invitation to consider the broader range of factors relevant
182
to a custody determination, such as where the child would be

177. Janet R. Johnston & Linda K. Girdner, Early Identification of Parents at Risk for
Custody Violations and Prevention of Child Abductions, 36 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV.
392, 395 (1998).
178. Glen Skoler, A Psychological Critique of International Child Custody and Abduction
Law, 32 FAM. L.Q. 557, 577 (1998).
179. As there is conflicting data on the percentage of domestic-violence allegations that are
unsubstantiated in custody disputes overall, it would be difficult to demonstrate whether
unsubstantiated claims are higher in the abduction context. See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D.
Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the
Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 395 n.76 (2008) (citing studies showing disparate percentages of
unsubstantiated domestic-violence allegations in custody cases).
180. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
181. Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005).
182. International Child Abduction Remedies Act § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2006)
(“The Convention and this chapter empower courts in the United States to determine only
rights under the Convention and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.”).
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184

happiest, who would be the better parent, or the relative strengths
185
of the parental bonds. In short, Article 13(b) is “not intended to be
used by defendants as a vehicle to litigate (or relitigate) the child’s
186
best interests.” One reason for this restrictive interpretation is that
an overly broad interpretation of the grave-risk exception would
undermine the Convention’s goal of swiftly returning abducted
187
children. But there is an equally compelling reason to avoid a bestinterests inquiry: determining the child’s best interests threatens to
invite the type of gender stereotyping prevalent in custody disputes.
In traditional custody contests, in which the child’s best interests
are appropriately the focal point, gender biases—real and
188
perceived—continue to color outcomes and disfavor fathers. Thus,
if Convention cases begin to consider the child’s best interests
through a loose interpretation of Article 13(b), as at least one
189
contracting state has done and some district courts are prone to
190
do, they too will be affected by gender biases. Left-behind fathers
accordingly may have to contend with gender bias at two stages: at
Convention proceedings, if Article 13(b) is interpreted too loosely,
and again at custody proceedings. Although gender biases are unfair
to both sexes, left-behind fathers, especially those accused of
domestic violence, already face unique logistical challenges in
191
litigating their cases that may not be present for fleeing mothers.
And, unfortunately, the Supreme Court has failed to squarely reject

183. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The exception for grave
harm to the child is not license for a court in the abducted-to country to speculate on where the
child would be happiest.”).
184. Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 459 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Courts are not to engage in a
custody determination or to address such questions as who would be the better parent in the
long run.”).
185. See Richard A. Gardner, Guidelines for Assessing Parental Preference in Child-Custody
Disputes, 30 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1, 2 (1999) (noting that evaluating the strength of the
parent-child psychological bond is the heart of a best-interests analysis in a custody dispute).
186. Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.
Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986).
187. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, supra note
4, art. 1, 1343 U.N.T.S. at 98; BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 7, at 29; see also PÉREZVERA, supra note 15, ¶ 34 (explaining that the exceptions to return “are to be interpreted in a
restrictive fashion if the Convention is not to become a dead letter”).
188. See infra Part III.B.2.
189. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text.
190. See infra Part III.B.1.
191. See supra Part III.A.2.
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192

gender stereotyping in its jurisprudence, creating the risk that lower
courts will rely at least in part upon gender stereotyping as a basis for
deciding Convention cases. The causal chain is straightforward: an
unhinged interpretation of Article 13(b) allows for a best-interests
inquiry, and a best-interests inquiry is often shaped by gender
stereotypes. If Article 13(b) is not interpreted with care, the
perception and reality of gender bias that afflict custody
determinations will also afflict Convention proceedings.
1. The Judicial Tendency to Conflate Grave Risk with Best
Interests. Despite Article 13(b)’s narrow ambit, which demands
“specific evidence” of a grave risk of harm upon return in order to
193
refuse to return a child, some courts have broadened their inquiries
194
to consider factors relevant to custody and best interests. Indeed,
the risk of launching into a best-interests inquiry looms large enough
to affect strategic litigation decisions. Convention expert Lawrence
Katz explains that he always goes to federal court because “[f]ederal
courts treat cases differently; generally speaking, state courts will turn
195
it into a best-interest case.” As family and custody issues are the
province of state law, state court judges are more likely than their
federal counterparts to see the Convention and custody cases as
analogous and thus to be drawn into a detailed best-interests
196
analysis.
Yet the risk of conflating best-interests and grave-risk inquiries
197
occurs in federal court as well. In England v. England, a mother
abducted her child from Australia into the United States. The district
court refused to order the child’s return, finding that returning the
child to Australia just to determine custody could result in her
ultimately being sent back to the United States to live with her
mother, and that “such movement back and forth poses a serious
198
threat to her psychological welfare.” The district court noted that it
192. See infra Part III.B.4.
193. Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir. 2005).
194. See infra text accompanying notes 206–13.
195. Telephone Interview with Lawrence Katz, Attorney, Law Offices of Attorney
Lawrence S. Katz (Nov. 17, 2009). Lawrence Katz is an International Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers fellow and has been litigating Convention cases since 1995.
196. See KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP, supra note 43, at 64 (noting that state court judges, as
opposed to federal judges, “are accustomed to making ‘best interest of the child’
determinations”).
197. England v. England, 234 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2000).
198. Id. at 271.
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would be difficult for the child “to be separated from her mother or
199
have to endure another move so soon after re-settling in Houston.”
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the potential of being
shuttled back and forth and its impact on the child was “inapposite”
because it did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of a grave
200
risk of psychological harm.
201
Similarly, in Nuñez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, the Eighth Circuit
reversed the lower court for expanding its grave-risk inquiry beyond
permissible bounds. The lower court had based its grave-risk finding
on the young age of the child and the impact of separating the child
202
from his mother. The Eighth Circuit found that those considerations
were irrelevant, because Article 13(b) “only requires an assessment of
whether the child will face immediate and substantial risk” if returned
203
to Mexico pending the custody determination. Whatever negative
impact the separation might occasion, it alone was not sufficient to
204
trigger the grave-risk exception.
Both England and Nuñez-Escudero demonstrate the tendency of
some courts to consider how separation from an abducting mother
during return would affect the child, a tendency that has also surfaced
205
in cases of abducting fathers. Such inquiries are inappropriate in
Convention proceedings because they ultimately pertain to custody:
to consider how the separation would affect the child is to evaluate
the strength of the parental bond itself—which is the focal point of a
206
custody determination based on the child’s best interests. In other
words, whereas reducing the emotional impact of a child’s separation
from a parent may be a valid consideration in determining a custodial

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Nuñez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 1995).
202. Id. at 377. The district court also cited the possibility that the child could be
institutionalized upon return, but the Eighth Circuit noted that no evidence was submitted to
support that possibility. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. District courts have lapsed inappropriately into best-interest inquiries when the leftbehind parent is the mother, only to be reversed on appeal. See, e.g., Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d
505, 510–11 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing the lower court’s refusal to return the child to her mother
when it had based its decision on judgments about her fitness as a parent and the child’s
attachment to its father).
206. See Gardner, supra note 185, at 2 (noting that the best-interests-of-the-child guideline
involves “trying to assess . . . which parent has the stronger and healthier psychological bond
with the child”).
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207

arrangement, it is largely irrelevant in determining whether there is
208
sufficient evidence of grave risk in a Convention proceeding.
Moreover, this broadening of Article 13(b) to include questions of
best interests and custody is not simply legal error; it also invites the
type of gender stereotyping that characterizes many custody contests.
2. Historical Gender Bias in Child Custody and Current Gender
Roles. Though fathers were given exclusive custody rights to their
legitimate children early in American history, by the 1920s a
preference for awarding custody to mothers had become
209
widespread. This “tender-years doctrine” gave legal imprimatur to
the belief that mothers were better suited to raise young children than
210
were fathers. In some states, this presumption continued until the
211
Even as other states replaced the tender-years
mid-1970s.
presumption with the best-interests-of-the-child test, however, there
212
was typically little difference between the two standards in practice.
Because society expected little of fathers in raising children, and
expected much of mothers, it was not surprising that judges generally
213
viewed maternal custody as “best” for the child.
Today, the best-interests test remains the dominant standard in
custody cases, despite an acknowledgement that it is more
214
aspirational than administrable. And though states have tried to
215
statutorily define the criteria used to determine best interests,
stereotypical gender roles continue to inform the content of the

207. See Joan B. Kelly & Robert E. Emery, Children’s Adjustment Following Divorce: Risk
and Resilience Perspectives, 52 FAM. REL. 352, 353 (2003) (noting that visitation arrangements
that do not take into account the abrupt departure of one parent after divorce and are not
“attuned to children’s developmental, social, and psychological needs” may increase postdivorce
stress for children).
208. See Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 220 n.14 (1st Cir. 2000) (“We disregard the
arguments that grave risk of harm may be established by the mere fact that removal would
unsettle the children who have now settled in the United States. That is an inevitable
consequence of removal.”).
209. Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, FUTURE CHILD., Spring 1994, at
121, 122.
210. Cynthia A. McNeely, Lagging Behind the Times: Parenthood, Custody, and Gender
Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 891, 897 (1998).
211. Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to
Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 962 (2005).
212. McNeely, supra note 210, at 903.
213. Id.
214. Bartlett, supra note 74, at 15–16.
215. Id. at 16.
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criteria. Simply put, what is “best” for the child is still implicitly
defined by the roles that society expects mothers and fathers to play,
both during and after their relationship. When a relationship ends,
mothers are expected to be primary caretakers and choose their
216
children above all else, or else risk social stigma as failures. But, as
Professor Solangel Maldonado notes, the expectations surrounding
postdivorce fathers are much more ambiguous: although fathers are
expected to provide child support, they get mixed messages from
217
society and from the law about their proper role in childrearing.
Fathers, by and large, are expected to maintain some type of
visitation schedule with their children, but most forms of visitation
218
involve them only minimally in childrearing. Thus, a father’s
219
postdivorce role is “primarily economic” with light childrearing
220
duties.
This type of gender stereotyping, affecting both mothers and
fathers, has not been lost on the Supreme Court, which has
recognized that “[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic roles are
reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic
221
responsibilities for men.”
These “mutually reinforcing
222
stereotypes” shape the content of best-interests inquiries and affect
the perceptions of all system actors—judges, fathers, mothers, and
223
lawyers.
3. Gender Bias in Custody Disputes—Real and Perceived. The
perception of gender bias in custody disputes and other aspects of
family law has given impetus to the fathers’ rights movement, which

216. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 984; see also McNeely, supra note 210, at 901 (“Woe to
the mother who did not choose to selflessly and altruistically place her children above all else,
for she would be deemed a failure as a mother, and as a woman.”).
217. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 939.
218. Id. at 976–77 (describing how many fathers consider even the most generous visitation
schedules—one weeknight per week, along with alternating weekends and holidays—far from
sufficient to maintain a parental relationship).
219. Id. at 940.
220. McNeely, supra note 210, at 914 (noting that the role of the postdivorce father is
limited to “financial provider and insignificant caretaker”).
221. Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
222. Id.
223. See generally Maldonado, supra note 211, at 967–75 (describing how stereotypes and
perceived biases may affect all actors in a custodial dispute).
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225

has generated academic commentary, activism, and a plethora of
226
self-help resources dedicated to custody-seeking fathers. Many
fathers’ rights advocates allege that custody laws, informed by an
underlying belief that men have only a limited role in childrearing,
227
are skewed against them.
The evidence, albeit qualified,
demonstrates that at least some of their claims are merited.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, over thirty states created task
228
forces to research the extent of gender bias in their custody systems.
Many states found that, despite neutral custody laws, some judges are
still influenced by societal beliefs that mothers are better parents than
229
fathers.
Summarizing the voluminous task force studies, one
researcher concluded that “[t]he majority of states found that courts
230
unjustly presume men to be inferior parents to women.” The
remnants of this preference for mothers may very well affect custody
decisions, as women continue to receive primary residential—that is,
231
physical—custody of children in the vast majority of cases.

224. See generally THE FATHERHOOD MOVEMENT: A CALL TO ACTION (Wade F. Horn,
David Blankenhorn & Mitchell B. Pearlstein eds., 1999) (collecting essays by leaders in the
fatherhood movement).
225. See, e.g., CROWLEY, supra note 138, at 36–38 (describing the emergence of modern
fathers’ rights activist groups); FATHERS & FAMILIES, http://www.fathersandfamilies.org (last
visited Jan. 9, 2011) (noting that the organization “seek[s] better lives for children through
family court reform”).
226. See JULIA LUYSTER, A FATHER’S RIGHT TO CUSTODY (2009) (offering resources and
support for fathers seeking custody and visitation rights); FATHER’S RIGHTS,
http://www.fathersrightsinc.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (same); FATHERS & DADS FOR
EQUAL CUSTODY RIGHTS, http://www.fathersrights.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (same);
FATHERS RIGHTS FOUND., http://www.fathers-rights.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (same).
227. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 967.
228. Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State
Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 3 n.1 (1996).
229. See Maldonado, supra note 211, at 968. Professor Maldonado calls specific attention to
both the Massachusetts and Georgia task forces. Id. The Massachusetts task force found that
“stereotypes about fathers may sometimes affect case outcomes.” Gender Bias Study of the
Court System in Massachusetts, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 748 (1990). The Georgia task force
interviewed many witnesses who testified that judges believe that mothers are better parents
than fathers are. Ga. Comm’n on Bias in the Judicial Sys., Supreme Court of Ga., Gender and
Justice in the Courts: A Report to the Supreme Court of Georgia by the Commission on Gender
Bias in the Judicial System, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 539, 658 (1992).
230. Swent, supra note 228, at 60.
231. See Maldonado, supra note 211, at 966 (noting that “sole residential custody to one
parent (usually the mother) is still the most common custodial arrangement after divorce”);
McNeely, supra note 210, at 916 (noting that women receive primary residential custody 90
percent of the time).
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Postdivorce fathers are typically granted visitation rights, leading to
233
sharp differences in the quality and quantity of parenting time.
Notably, judges decide only 5 percent of all custody disputes; in
the remainder of cases, parents voluntarily enter into custody
234
agreements without judicial intervention. And when parents strike a
custodial agreement rather than litigate, they overwhelmingly agree
235
to award sole physical custody to the mother. These statistics are
striking because when fathers choose to litigate for sole or joint
236
physical custody, they are successful more often than not. The
question then remains: why do fathers fail to litigate?
In answering this question, what may be more relevant than
actual gender bias is the perception that bias exists. Fathers may feel
that the system is biased, even when it is not, and therefore may not
237
seek custody. Attorneys, half of whom believe that the assumption
that young children belong with their mothers is always or usually
238
made in resolving child custody cases, may reinforce fathers’
perceptions by suggesting to their clients that the chances of
239
succeeding are minimal.
And most pointedly, as Professor
Maldonado notes, many fathers may have internalized the social
expectations that fatherhood does not extend beyond economic
240
support. That is, the same stereotypes that affect judges in custody

232. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 946.
233. It is common for divorced fathers to receive visitation only every other weekend.
McNeely, supra note 210, at 905 n.87. Even then, this visitation schedule may not translate into
actual parenting time, as many divorced fathers fail to exercise their visitation rights.
Maldonado, supra note 211, at 946–47. Further, the time that visiting fathers do spend with their
children is often dedicated to entertaining them, rather than parenting them. Id. at 948–49.
234. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 973.
235. Id. at n.259 (citing a study which found that couples agreed to sole maternal custody in
86 percent of cases).
236. Id. at 973–74, 974 n.261.
237. See Gender and Justice in the Courts, supra note 229, at 660 (describing the testimony of
witnesses who stated that fathers were dissuaded from seeking custody because they thought it
would be futile).
238. Douglas Dotterweich & Michael McKinney, National Attitudes Regarding Gender Bias
in Child Custody Cases, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 208, 212 tbl.1 (2000). The
perception of gender bias is different among males than among females: 56 percent of male
attorneys and 34 percent of female attorneys believe that custody awards are made based on the
presumption that young children belong with their mothers. Id.
239. Maldonado, supra note 211, at 974.
240. Id. at 974–75.
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decisions may dissuade fathers from seeking physical custody in the
241
first place.
Thus, to the extent that Convention proceedings become
intertwined with custody matters and best-interests inquiries—a
distinct risk of an unhinged interpretation of Article 13(b)—leftbehind fathers are at a greater risk of gender biases among system
actors, including themselves, that will make litigating their cases even
more difficult.
4. Mixed Messages from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
has spoken out of both sides of its mouth on the matter of gender
stereotyping. Though the Court has rejected gender stereotyping as
an administrative proxy, it has, at other times, reinforced a detached,
highly circumscribed notion of fatherhood.
242
In Stanley v. Illinois, a father named Peter Stanley had lived
with his three children intermittently for eighteen years, though he
243
had never married their mother. When the mother died, the
children automatically became wards of the state, because state law
244
presumed Stanley, an unmarried father, unfit as a parent. Stanley—
unlike married, divorced, or widowed fathers—would have to prove
245
his parental fitness in a separate proceeding. Illinois argued that it
was permissible to require unmarried fathers to clear this extra legal
hurdle, because the state was entitled to rely on a presumption of the
246
parental unfitness of unmarried fathers. The Supreme Court flatly
rejected this argument. It noted that, although “[p]rocedure by
presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination,” “the Constitution recognizes higher values than
247
speed and efficiency.” In other words, even if it were true that most

241. To claim that the perception of gender bias disadvantages fathers is not to deny that
gender bias unfairly affects mothers as well. See id. at 970–71 (arguing that women are held to
higher parenting standards than men when custodial disputes are litigated). The internalization
of bias or stereotypes has a disproportionate effect on fathers, however, insofar as it discourages
them from pressing for custody rights. Social expectations for postdivorce mothers create
pressure for them to seek custody. See supra text accompanying note 216. Conversely, social
expectations for postdivorce fathers, which minimize their postdivorce childrearing role, create
no such pressure. See supra text accompanying notes 219–22.
242. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
243. Id. at 646.
244. Id. at 646–47.
245. Id. at 647–48.
246. Id. at 653 n.5.
247. Id. at 656–57.
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unwed fathers are unfit, the state could not rely on stereotyping to
lighten its own administrative burden. In this light, Stanley can be
248
read as a clear refutation of gender stereotyping.
More recently, however, the Court has embraced gender
249
stereotyping. In Nguyen v. INS, the Court considered a federal
statute that distinguished between unmarried citizen fathers and
250
unmarried citizen mothers. Under the statute, a child born abroad
to a citizen mother became a citizen at birth, whereas a child born
abroad to a citizen father had to be legally acknowledged by him
prior to turning eighteen—or else the child could not claim citizenship
251
through the father. Nguyen, the twenty-two-year-old son of an
American soldier in Vietnam, faced deportation as a result of
252
criminal charges. Though Nguyen had lived with his father in Texas
since he was six years old, he was at risk of deportation because his
father had not legally acknowledged his paternity as required by the
253
statute.
The Court upheld the statute as a valid expression of two
governmental interests, the second of which directly relates to gender
254
stereotyping. The Court held that the differential treatment in the
statute ensured that there was an opportunity for the child to develop
248. Stanley is not without its critics. Indeed, the Court did not reject the contention of the
state that unwed fathers were presumably poor parents; it held only that the presumption could
not be relied upon to alleviate administrative burdens. Id. at 654. And Chief Justice Burger, in
his dissent, went so far as to embrace the validity of the presumption. Id. at 665–66 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). For a critical view of Stanley and other “core” fatherhood cases, see Nancy E.
Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J.
1271, 1297–1307 (2005).
249. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). The Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in
a case related to Nguyen. The petitioner in Flores-Villar v. United States, No. 09-5801 (U.S.
argued Nov. 10, 2010), challenged the longer residency requirements imposed on unmarried
American men whose children are born abroad and who seek to pass citizenship onto their
children. Petitioners did not seek to overrule Nguyen, but to distinguish it. Brief for Petitioner at
5, Flores-Villar, No. 09-5801, available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/0910/09-5801_Petitioner.pdf.
250. 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2006).
251. Compare id. § 1409(a)(4)(B) (requiring citizen fathers to acknowledge paternity under
oath prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday), with id. § 1409(c) (imposing no requirement of
acknowledgment upon citizen mothers).
252. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
253. Id. at 57–58.
254. The first governmental interest was assuring that a parent-child relationship in fact
exists; it is easy to verify the mother’s status, by virtue of her having given birth, but it is harder
to verify the father’s status. Id. at 66–67. This is a curious holding, as there are ample genderneutral ways of affirming parentage. See id. at 80–81 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing
various gender-neutral means of achieving the goals of the statute).
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a relationship consisting of genuine ties to the parent—and thus to
255
the United States—rather than just a formal or legal relationship.
The Court explained that mothers, by virtue of giving birth,
automatically create the opportunity for a “real, meaningful
256
relationship” to develop between them and their children. For
fathers, it is a different story:
The same opportunity does not result from the event of birth, as a
matter of biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed father.
Given the 9-month interval between conception and birth, it is not
always certain that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor
is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father’s
identity. This fact takes on particular significance in the case of a
child born overseas and out of wedlock. One concern in this context
has always been with young people, men for the most part, who are
257
on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries.

In so holding, the Court relied upon an image of men as detached,
irresponsible figures, absent from their children’s lives, whereas
mothers, simply by giving birth, are predisposed to nurture and
258
develop a genuine relationship with their children. But why does the
opportunity to develop a genuine relationship not inhere in the father
as well, if he is present in his child’s life from a young age? Justice
O’Connor, in a sharp dissent, answered that question:
There is no reason, other than stereotype, to say that fathers who
are present at birth lack an opportunity for a relationship on similar
terms. . . . [T]he goal of a “real, practical relationship” thus finds
support not in biological differences but instead in a stereotype—i.e.,
“the generalization that mothers are significantly more likely than
259
fathers . . . to develop caring relationships with their children.”

By upholding the statute, the Court aided the concretization of the
stereotype that fathers are simply less interested in the lives of their
260
children. This stereotype is similar to that ascribed to postdivorce

255. Id. at 66–67 (majority opinion).
256. Id. at 65.
257. Id.
258. Dowd, supra note 248, at 1282.
259. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 87–89 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Albright, 523
U.S. 420, 482–83 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
260. Once again, the stereotypes are mutually reinforcing. The effect of painting unmarried
men as detached and distant is to relieve them of all responsibility, placing the responsibility of
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fathers, whose expected role involves the provision of economic
261
support and minimal parental responsibilities.
Thus, the message from the Supreme Court has been mixed. In
its earlier decision, the Court rejected gender stereotypes when
employed simply to ease administrative burdens. More recently, the
Court has upheld a facially discriminatory statute by relying on those
very same gender stereotypes. And when the Supreme Court relies
on gender stereotypes, it helps to ensure their continued acceptance
and use by lower courts. If Convention cases veer into best-interests
inquiries through an overly broad interpretation of Article 13(b),
judges and lawyers will be tempted to reproduce the Court’s reliance
on gender stereotypes when litigating and deciding Convention cases.
C. Fathers’ Rights in the Domestic Context under the UCCJEA
Fathers, of course, are not left behind only when mothers cross
international borders; fathers can also be left behind in the domestic
context. And interparental violence is a motivating factor in
262
abductions between U.S. states as well. Although the domestic and
international contexts are different—the international context poses
issues of language, culture, and legal training that are absent in the
domestic context—it is instructive to compare briefly how the
domestic legal framework handles the rights of left-behind fathers in
cases of interstate abduction. The domestic framework, more so than
the Convention, protects the rights of left-behind fathers—suggesting
that judges should be particularly sensitive to the situation of foreign
left-behind fathers. These greater protections also suggest that the
Convention, to the extent possible, should adopt some of the features
of the domestic legal framework.
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
263
(UCCJEA), drafted in 1997 and now adopted by forty-eight
264
states, governs child abductions and custody disputes between most

nonmarital children entirely upon the shoulders of women. See id. at 92 (noting that placing
responsibility for nonmarital children on women is “paradigmatic of a historic regime”).
261. See supra notes 217–20 and accompanying text.
262. Deborah M. Goelman, Shelter from the Storm: Using Jurisdictional Statutes to Protect
Victims of Domestic Violence After the Violence Against Women Act of 2000, 13 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 101, 101 (2004).
263. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT, 9 U.L.A. 649 (1997).
264. Only Massachusetts and Vermont have yet to adopt the UCCJEA into their state
codes. See A Few Facts About the Uniform Child Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act, UNIFORM L.
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265

American states. Key to the UCCJEA is its emphasis on home state
266
priority. A “home State” is defined as “the state in which a child
lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six
consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a
267
child-custody proceeding.” As long as the left-behind parent files a
custody petition in the home state within six months of the abduction,
the custody case will remain in the home state—thus defeating any
268
attempt at forum shopping.
The UCCJEA parallels the Convention in many respects. Like
the Convention, the UCCJEA seeks to avoid the harmful effects on
269
children caused by jurisdictional conflict and forum shifting; to
deter child abduction by discouraging the use of the interstate system
270
to litigate child custody; to promote cooperation among states,
whereby ultimate custody decisions are rendered by the state best
271
positioned to do so; and to avoid best-interests-of-the-child inquiries
272
by judges in jurisdictions to which the abductor has fled. Despite
these similarities, however, the UCCJEA does a better job of
protecting the rights of left-behind fathers in two key respects:
judicial communication and the taking of out-of-state evidence.

COMMISSION, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccjea.asp
(last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (listing states that have adopted the UCCJEA).
265. Celia Guzaldo Gamrath, UCCJEA: A New Approach to Custody Jurisdiction and
Interstate Custody and Visitation, 92 ILL. B.J. 204, 204 (2004).
266. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 201 cmt. 1, 9
U.L.A. at 672 (describing the provision establishing home-state jurisdiction).
267. Id. § 102(7), 9 U.L.A. at 658.
268. See id. § 208 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 684 (“Most of the jurisdictional problems generated by
abducting parents should be solved by the prioritization of home State . . . . For example, if a
parent takes the child from the home State and seeks an original custody determination
elsewhere, the stay-at-home parent has six months to file a custody petition under the extended
home state jurisdictional provision of Section 201, which will ensure that the case is retained in
the home State.”).
269. Id. § 101 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 657.
270. Id.
271. Id. The home state under the UCCJEA is analogous, though not identical, to the
country of habitual residence under the Convention. In both cases, it is presumed that ultimate
decisions regarding custody are best made in the jurisdiction from which the child was taken. In
the UCCJEA context, that presumption is expressed through the jurisdictional preferences
noted previously. In the Convention context, that presumption is expressed through the rule of
return.
272. Id. prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. at 652. (“The UCCJEA eliminates the term ‘best interests’
in order to clearly distinguish between the jurisdictional standards and the substantive standards
relating to custody and visitation of children.”).
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1. Judicial Communication. The UCCJEA allows judges in the
refuge state to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction in the event
of domestic-violence allegations, thus protecting the fleeing parent
273
and the child. After exercising such jurisdiction, however, the
refuge-state judge, if aware that a custody proceeding has already
been commenced in the home state, must communicate with the
274
judge in the home state. At the same time, the home-state judge, if
on notice that a custody proceeding has been commenced in the
275
refuge state, must communicate with the refuge-state judge. The
purpose of these mutually obligatory provisions is to protect the
safety and rights of the parents and the child, and to resolve the
276
emergency. These provisions are critical in domestic-violence cases
because they create a “template for communication” that “ensur[es]
277
that the courts have input from both parties.”
There is enthusiasm for increased judicial communication in
278
Convention cases, along the lines of what the UCCJEA already
requires. The Special Commission charged with reviewing the
operation of the Convention recently reaffirmed its support for direct
279
judicial communication, an implicit recognition that the UCCJEA is
280
a good model to follow. Increased transnational communication in
Convention cases would allow courts to “suggest and produce
settlements between the parents to facilitate the return process, to
remove practical obstacles to return, [and] to help to ensure that the

273. Id. § 204(a), 9 U.L.A. at 676.
274. Id. § 204(d), 9 U.L.A. at 677.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Goelman, supra note 262, at 140–41.
278. E.g., Special Focus: Direct Judicial Communications on Family Law Matters and the
Development of Judicial Networks, EC-HCCH Joint Conference, Brussels, 15–16 January 2009,
JUDGES’ NEWSL. (The Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law, the Hague, Neth.), Autumn
2009, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/news2009.pdf (collecting essays by judges in
support of and evidencing the use of judicial communication).
279. See SPECIAL COMM’N, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FIFTH MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION TO REVIEW
THE OPERATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS
OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION AND THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
HAGUE CONVENTION OF 19 OCTOBER 1996 ON JURISDICTION, APPLICABLE LAW,
RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT AND CO-OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PARENTAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN ¶ 1.6.3, at 9 (2006),
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/concl28sc5_e.pdf (concluding that contracting states
should encourage judicial communication).
280. Telephone Interview with Stephen J. Cullen & Kelly A. Powers, supra note 157.
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prompt return may be effected in safe and secure conditions for the
281
child.”
Although these benefits of judicial communication would
redound to all parties generally, they would be particularly helpful for
left-behind fathers. With open judicial communication, judges could
be more confident that their return orders would ensure the safety of
282
the child, and accordingly there would be less need for protracted
proceedings involving allegations under Article 13(b) and less risk
that judges would impermissibly consider best interests. English
family-law judge Andrew Moylan has documented his use of judicial
communication to facilitate returns in cases that involved grave-risk
283
allegations, and some American judges have indicated their support
284
of this approach.
Ultimately, “[d]irect international judicial
communications may reduce the number of decisions refusing
285
return”—which would benefit left-behind fathers immensely.
There are some barriers to judicial communication in the
international context that do not exist domestically. American judges
may be hesitant to communicate with their foreign counterparts due
to differences in language, legal cultures, or individual judicial
286
philosophies. As a result, there is currently a low level of cross287
border judicial communication in Convention cases. Nonetheless,
increased judicial communication is a goal toward which judges
should aspire, and from which left-behind fathers would benefit.

281. Philippe Lortie, Background to the International Hague Network of Judges, reprinted in
JUDGES’ NEWSL., supra note 278, at 36, 38.
282. Id.
283. Andrew Moylan, Experience of a Judge from England & Wales, reprinted in JUDGES’
NEWSL., supra note 278, at 17, 18–19 (describing a case in which judicial communication
facilitated a prompt return from England to Malta, even though Article 13(b) allegations were
raised).
284. E.g., Panazatou v. Pantazatos, No. FA 960713571S, 1997 WL 614519, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1997) (indicating the judge’s intention “to arrange a conference call to a
Judge in Greece similar to conference calls in this country under our Uniform Child Custody
Act [predecessor to the UCCJEA]” in order to resolve a Convention case in which grave risk of
psychological harm was alleged under Article 13(b)).
285. Lortie, supra note 281, at 36, 38.
286. James Garbolino, The Experience of Judges from the United States of America with
Direct Judicial Communication, reprinted in JUDGES’ NEWSL., supra note 278, at 24, 35.
287. Id. at 31.
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2. Interstate Discovery Provisions.
The UCCJEA also
288
encourages and facilitates interstate discovery. In the case of
domestic-violence allegations, for instance, a court that assumes
jurisdiction may order that the testimony of a witness be taken in
289
another state. The UCCJEA specifically contemplates the use of
telephonic or audiovisual testimony, and courts are directed to
cooperate with one another when choosing the location for taking
290
depositions or testimony.
These provisions are especially
appropriate in domestic-violence cases, in which the safety of the
291
parents or the child might otherwise be in jeopardy. At the same
time, these mechanisms help to ensure that left-behind fathers are
able to testify and be deposed, thus allowing them to share their side
of the story.
These discovery provisions would be welcome in the context of
the Convention. Foreign left-behind fathers, who may find it difficult
292
to travel to the United States for a hearing, would be able to testify
remotely. And American judges, unaccustomed to ruling on the basis
293
of affidavits alone, might be more likely through remote testimony
to weigh carefully the interests of the left-behind father and thus feel
more comfortable returning a child. Just as direct judicial
communication benefits left-behind fathers by facilitating returns, so
would increased use of technology for discovery and testimonial
purposes.
Despite the UCCJEA provisions, there has been some
reluctance on the part of judges to use technology to obtain
294
information from other states in domestic abduction cases. And if
there is reluctance in the domestic context, in which a framework for
communication exists, it is likely there would be even more
reluctance in Convention cases, in which no such framework exists.
American judges are simply more accustomed to having both parties

288.
(1997).
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 111, 9 U.L.A. 668
Id. § 111(a), 9 U.L.A. at 668.
Id. § 111(b), 9 U.L.A. at 668.
Id. § 210 cmt., 9 U.L.A. at 688.
See supra notes 169–70 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 165.
Goelman, supra note 262, at 142.
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present in the courtroom, and they may not be comfortable with, or
295
may simply lack the resources to conduct, remote testimony.
Even if it is not possible to incorporate all of the UCCJEA’s
provisions regarding judicial communication and interstate discovery
into the Convention, it is an important model toward which to strive.
Recent efforts to enhance judicial communication and cooperation
296
under the Convention are welcome insofar as these measures would
better protect the rights of left-behind fathers. In the meantime,
judges assigned to international-abduction cases must be sensitive to
the disadvantages that foreign left-behind fathers face—
disadvantages that largely do not exist in the domestic context under
297
the UCCJEA.
CONCLUSION
Interparental violence motivates, and will continue to motivate,
cross-border child abductions by fleeing mothers. Article 13(b) of the
Convention, and specifically the grave-risk-of-psychological-harm
exception, is the vehicle through which fleeing mothers resist the
return of their children under the Convention. If courts understand
and appreciate the well-documented link between exposure to
domestic violence and psychological harm, Article 13(b) will go a

295. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. In the author’s experience, some judges are
reluctant to take remote testimony across international borders—especially telephonic
testimony—due to difficulties in verifying the identity of the speaker or ensuring that he is
properly under oath. Other courts may simply lack the resources. See Dionisio Núñez Verdin,
Future Use of Information Technology for Direct Judicial Communications, reprinted in JUDGES’
NEWSL., supra note 278, at 178, 181 (noting that “most courts lack” sufficient technological
resources for direct judicial communications in child abduction cases).
296. See Garbolino, supra note 286, at 24, 31–32 (describing efforts of judges in the last
decade to use direct judicial communication to resolve cases under the Convention).
297. It is true that in some international child abduction cases, attorneys may file under the
UCCJEA, rather than the Convention, as the UCCJEA treats a child custody order from a
foreign tribunal like a child custody order from any other state. UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 105(a), 9 U.L.A. 662 (1997). But attorneys for leftbehind fathers often have no choice but to file under the Convention. First, to file under the
UCCJEA, a left-behind father needs a formal child custody order that complies with the
procedural requirements of the UCCJEA. Conversely, the Convention requires only proof of
“custody rights”—a much broader standard which can arise under operation of law, not just
through a formal custody decree. Compare KILPATRICK STOCKTON LLP, supra note 43, at 95
(discussing how a left-behind parent must have an order awarding custody to file under the
UCCJEA), with id. at 20–22 (discussing how a left-behind parent can have “custody rights”
under the Convention without a formal decree, sometimes merely by showing proof of
parentage). Second, petitions under the UCCJEA must be filed in state court, where many
Convention practitioners are loath to file. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.
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long way toward protecting victims of domestic violence and their
children. To enhance this protection, courts that still require a fleeing
parent to show how the country of habitual residence is unable or
unwilling to protect the child should abandon this requirement.
At the same time, it is necessary to understand the precarious
position of left-behind fathers, whether they are batterers or not.
Although a Convention hearing does not determine custody, the
stakes for left-behind fathers are nonetheless high. Many left-behind
fathers must rely on legal aid in the United States, yet obtaining pro
bono legal assistance for Convention cases, especially those in which
there are allegations of domestic violence, is a daunting task. At the
very least, increased funding for legal aid organizations willing to take
on such cases—a prospect that Congress has considered but not
decisively acted upon—is necessary to equalize the playing field.
Furthermore, although the urge to protect victims of domestic
violence and their children is wholly understandable, courts must not
imbue Convention proceedings with the attributes of custody
disputes, as doing so will allow gender stereotypes to complicate the
proceedings and further weaken the protection of left-behind fathers’
rights. Instead, the Convention should follow the lead of the
UCCJEA, which does a better job protecting the rights of left-behind
fathers.
The Convention can remain both relevant to the modern context
of domestic violence and fair to left-behind fathers. And although by
no means a perfect solution, it continues to be the best hope for
combating the vexing problem of international child abduction.

